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Abstract
We characterize one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles with a small number of alter-
natives and voters. In particular, we show the following.
• Every preference profile with up to two voters is one-dimensional Euclidean if and only if
it is single-peaked.
• Every preference profile with up to five alternatives is one-dimensional Euclidean if and
only if it is single-peaked and single-crossing.
By [12], we thus obtain that the smallest single-peaked and single-crossing preference profiles
that are not one-dimensional Euclidean consist of three voters and six alternatives.
JEL classification D81 D72
1 Introduction
The one-dimensional Euclidean preference domain (also known as the unidimensional unfolding
domain) is a spatial model of structured preferences which originates from economics [16, 15],
political sciences [20, 6, 4], and psychology [13, 5]. In this domain, the alternatives and the voters
are points in a one-dimensional space, i.e. on the real line, such that the preference of each voter
towards an alternative decreases as the Euclidean distance between their points increases.
One-dimensional Euclidean preferences are necessarily single-peaked [2] and single-crossing [19]
as proven by Coombs [13], Doignon and Falmagne [14], Chen et al. [12]. The reverse, however,
does not hold. In his work, Coombs [13] provided a sample preference profile with 16 voters and
6 alternatives that is single-peaked and single-crossing, but not one-dimensional Euclidean. This
counterexample appears to be quite large for real world scenarios. For instance, in rank aggregation
or winner determination elections, one typically either has few alternatives to begin with, or may
consolidate first make a shortlist of only a few alternatives out of many, which will be considered
for the final decision. There are also settings where only a few voters are involved, as for instance
in a hiring committee or when planning holidays for a family. Hence, a natural question arising
in the context of one-dimensional Euclidean preferences is whether for profiles with less than 16
voters or less than 6 alternatives, being single-peaked and single-crossing is sufficient to guarantee a
one-dimensional Euclidean embedding. In other words, we are interested in the following question:
Are there tight upper bounds on the number of alternatives or voters such that profiles within these
bounds are one-dimensional Euclidean as long as they are single-peaked and single-crossing? Re-
cently, Chen et al. [12] provided a single-peaked and single-crossing profile with three voters and six
alternatives that is not one-dimensional Euclidean. In this paper, we show that this counterexample
is indeed minimal in terms of the number of voters and the number of alternatives. In terms of the
number of voters, we provide an algorithm that constructs a one-dimensional Euclidean embedding
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for any single-peaked preference profile with two voters (see Algorithm 1). As for the number of
alternatives, we show via computer program that all single-peaked and single-crossing preferences
with up to five alternatives are one-dimensional Euclidean (see Theorem 3). We refer to the work
of Bredereck et al. [8] and the literature cited there for further discussion of the single-peaked and
the single-crossing preference domains.
Paper outline. In Section 2, we introduce necessary definitions, including single-peaked and
single-crossing preferences, and the one-dimensional Euclidean representation. We also discuss some
fundamental observations regarding these domain restrictions. In Section 3, we formulate our first
main result in Theorems 1 and 2. We prove this result by providing an algorithm (see Algorithm 1)
that constructs a one-dimensional Euclidean embedding for any two preference orders which are
single-peaked. At the end of the section, we provide an example to illustrate Algorithm 1 (see
Example 3). In Section 4, we provide our second main result by describing the computer program
that finds all possible preference profiles with up to five alternatives that are both single-peaked
and single-crossing, and uses the publicly available CPLEX solver to provide a one-dimensional
Euclidean embedding for each of theser profiles (see Theorem 3). The code and the embeddings
for all produced profiles are available from https://tubcloud.tu-berlin.de/s/rSNKkm8dtPkRKnE
and https://tubcloud.tu-berlin.de/s/ArdQzFd8J6L5YFN, respectively.
2 Definitions and notations
Let A := {1, . . . ,m} be a set of alternatives. A preference order ≻ over A is a linear order over
A; a linear order is a binary relation which is total, irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. Given
a preference order ≻, we use  to denote the binary relation which includes ≻ and preserves the
reflexivity, i.e. :=≻∪{(a, a) | a ∈ A}. An alternative c is the most preferred alternative in ≻ if for
each alternative b ∈ A it holds that a  b. For two distinct alternatives a and b, the relation a ≻ b
means that a is strictly preferred to (or in other words, ranked higher than) b. The notion {a, b} ≻i c
means that both a and b are strictly preferred to (or in other words, ranked higher than) c, but the
preference relation between alternatives a and b is arbitrary but unique.
A preference profile P specifies the preference orders of some voters over some alternatives.
Formally, P := (A,V,R := (≻1, . . . ,≻n)), where A denotes the set of m alternatives, V denotes the
set of n voters, and R is a collection of n preference orders such that each voter vi ∈ V ranks the
alternatives according to the preference order ≻i on A. We also assume that no two voters in a
preference profile have the same preference orders.
2.1 Single-peaked preferences
The single-peaked property was introduced by Black [3] and has since been studied extensively.
Definition 1 (single-peaked property).
A preference order ≻ on a set A of alternatives is single-peaked with respect to a linear order ⊲ of the
alternatives if for its most preferred alternative a∗ and for each two distinct alternatives b, c ∈ A\{a∗}
it holds that
if c⊲ b⊲ a∗ or a∗ ⊲ b⊲ c, then b ≻ c.
A preference profile with voter set V, is single-peaked if there is a linear order ⊲ of alternatives such
that the preference order of each voter from V is single-peaked with respect to ⊲.
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Slightly abusing the terminology, we say that two preference orders are single-peaked if there is a
linear order with respect to which each of these two preference orders is single-peaked.
The single-peaked property can be characterized by two forbidden subprofiles, worst-diverse
configurations and α-configurations [1]. The former is defined on three preference orders while the
latter is defined on two preference orders. By the α-configuration, for two arbitrary preference
orders ≻1 and ≻2, we can observe the following.
Lemma 1. Two preference orders, denoted as ≻1 and ≻2, on the set A are single-peaked if and
only if for all four distinct alternatives x, y, z, w ∈ A such that x ≻1 y ≻1 z and z ≻2 y ≻2 x it
holds that y ≻1 w or y ≻2 w.
2.2 Single-crossing property
Single-crossing profiles date back to the seventies, when Mirrlees [18] and Roberts [19] observed that
voters voting on income taxation may form a linear order such that between each two tax rates, the
voters along the order either all agree on the relative positions of both rates, or there is one spot
where the voters switch from preferring one rate to preferring the other rate.
Definition 2 (single-crossing property).
A linear order of voters is single-crossing with respect to a pair {a, b} of alternatives, if there is at
most one voter in this order such that all voters ordered ahead of this voter strictly prefer a to b,
and all voters not ordered ahead of this voters strictly prefer b to a.
A linear order of voters is a single-crossing order, if it is single-crossing with respect to every
possible pair of alternatives. A preference profile is single-crossing if it allows a single-crossing order
of the voters.
The single-crossing property can be characterized by two forbidden subprofiles, γ-configurations
and δ-configurations [7].
2.3 One-dimensional Euclidean representation
Definition 3 (one-dimensional Euclidean representation).
Let P := (A,V := {v1, . . . , vn},R := (≻1, . . . ,≻n)) be a preference profile. Let E : A ∪ V → R
be an embedding of the alternatives and the voters into the real line where each two distinct
alternatives a, b ∈ A have different values, that is, E(a) 6= E(b). A voter vi ∈ V is one-dimensional
Euclidean with respect to E if for each two distinct alternatives a, b ∈ A voter vi strictly prefers
the one closer to him, that is,
if a ≻i b, then |E(a)− E(vi)| < |E(b) −E(vi)|.
An embedding E of the alternatives and voters is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation
of profile P if each voter in V is one-dimensional Euclidean with respect to E.
A profile is one-dimensional Euclidean if it has a one-dimensional Euclidean representation.
The one-dimensional Euclidean definition implies the following.
Observation 1 ([12]). A voter vi ∈ V is one-dimensional Euclidean with respect to an embedding
E of the alternatives and voters if and only if for each two distinct alternatives a and b with a ≻i b
it holds that if E(a) < E(b) then E(vi) <
1
2(E(a) + E(b)); otherwise E(vi) >
1
2(E(a) + E(b)).
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The following observation regarding the relation between single-peaked and single-crossing pro-
files and the one-dimensional Euclidean representation is also known from the literature [13, 14, 12].
Observation 2. If a profile is one-dimensional Euclidean, then it is also single-peaked and single-
crossing.
Proof. It is straight-forward to see that if there is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation E of
a given profile, then this profile is single-peaked with respect to the order induced by ordering the
alternatives according to their values in E. Moreover, it is single-crossing with respect to the order
induced by ordering the voters according to their values in E.
3 Single-peaked profiles with two voters are one-dimensional Eu-
clidean
In this section, we formulate and prove our first main result.
Theorem 1. Given a profile with two voters v1 and v2 whose preference orders ≻1 and ≻2 are
single-peaked, Algorithm 1 returns a one-dimensional Euclidean representation of this profile.
We can conclude the following from Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. A profile P with two voters is one-dimensional Euclidean if and only if it is single-
peaked.
Proof. The “only if” part follows from Observation 2 and the “if” part follows from Theorem 1.
In the remainder of this section, we show the correctness of Theorem 1.
3.1 Algorithm 1 and some technical results
The general idea behind the algorithm in Theorem 1 is to first embed all inner alternatives that
are ranked by both voters v1 and v2 between a1 and b1, and embed voter v1 (resp. v2) to the left
of alternative a1 (resp. to right of alternative b1). Then, the algorithm extends the embedding by
successively embedding some appropriately selected alternatives to the left or to the right of the
already embedded alternatives so as to obtain an extended embedding with respect to which one of
the voters is one-dimensional Euclidean. The single-peaked property, according to Lemma 1, guar-
antees that the extension by these alternatives remains a one-dimensional Euclidean representation
for the other voter.
We introduce the following notion.
Definition 4 (Inner alternatives). Let ≻1 and ≻2 be two preference orders, and let a1 and b1 be
the most preferred alternatives of ≻1 and ≻2, respectively. The set of inner alternatives of ≻1 and
≻2, denoted as inner(≻1,≻2), is the set of all alternatives that are ranked between a1 and b1 by
both ≻1 and ≻2:
inner(≻1,≻2) := {c | c 1 b1 ∧ c 2 a1}.
Example 1. Consider two preference orders≻1 and≻2 with 1 ≻1 2 ≻1 3 ≻1 4 and 3 ≻2 4 ≻2 1 ≻2 2.
The set of inner alternatives by ≻1 and ≻2 is inner(≻1,≻2) = {1, 3}.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm for computing a one-dimensional Euclidean embedding for two pref-
erence orders, one with a1 ≻1 a2 ≻1 . . . ≻1 am and the other b1 ≻2 b2 ≻2 . . . ≻2 bm.
Input:
a1 ≻1 a2 ≻1 . . . ≻1 am — voter v1’s preference order
b1 ≻2 b2 ≻2 . . . ≻2 bm — voter v2’s preference order
Output: Embeddings E : {1, 2, . . . ,m} ∪ {v1, v2} → R
1 Embed(≻1, ≻2):
/* Initialize the embedding by starting with the voters and the ‘inner’ alternatives. */
2 Let p← 1
3 for i = 1, 2 . . . ,m do
4 if bi 1 b1 ∧ bi 2 a1 then
5 E(bi) = p
6 p← p+ 1
7 E(v2) = 0
8 E(v1) = p
9 repeat
10 s1 ← Refine(≻1,v1)
11 s2 ← Refine(≻2,v2)
12 if s1 = false ∧ s2 = false then
13 Fallback()
14 until E(c) defined for all alternative c
/* Refine positions for preference order ≻ */
15 Refine(≻ : c1 ≻ · · · ≻ cm, v ∈ {v1, v2}):
16 j ← argmin{x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} | E(cx) = undefined}
17 i← argmin{x ∈ {j + 1, j + 2, . . . ,m} | E(cx) = defined}
18 if i exists then
19 dist(j − 1)← |E(v)− E(cj−1)|
20 dist(i)← |E(v)− E(ci)|
21 for k = j, j + 1, . . . , i− 1 do
22 if v = v1 then
23 E(ck)← E(v1) + dist(j − 1) +
dist(i)−dist(j−1)
i−j+1
· (k − j + 1)
24 else
25 E(ck)← E(v2)− dist(j − 1)−
dist(i)−dist(j−1)
i−j+1
· (k − j + 1)
26 return true
27 else
28 return false
/* Refine fall back */
29 Fallback():
30 j ← argmin{x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} | E(ax) = undefined}
31 if j exists then
32 E(aj)← E(v1) + |E(v1)− E(aj−1)|+ 1
We observe the following properties concerning the inner alternatives of two single-peaked pref-
erences.
Lemma 2. Consider two preference orders ≻1 and ≻2.
(1) For each r ∈ {1, 2}, the most preferred alternative of ≻r belongs to inner(≻1,≻2).
(2) For each two distinct inner alternatives x, y ∈ inner(≻1,≻2) and for an arbitrary alternative z
distinct from x and y it holds that if z ≻1 x and z ≻2 x, then z ∈ inner(≻1,≻2).
(3) If ≻1 and ≻2 are single-peaked, then for each two distinct inner alternatives x, y ∈ inner(≻1,≻2)
it holds that x ≻1 y if and only if y ≻2 x.
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Proof. The first statement follows from the definition of inner.
As to the second statement, since x ∈ inner(≻1,≻2), if z ≻1 x and z ≻2 x, then by the transitivity
of preference orders, it follows that z 1 b1 and z 2 a1. By the definition of inner, we immediately
have that z ∈ inner(≻1,≻2).
It remains to show the last statement. If a1 = b1, then by the definition of inner it holds
that inner(≻1,≻2) = {a1} = {b1}, and the second statement holds immediately since inner(≻1,≻2)
has only one alternative. Thus, let us assume that a1 6= b1 so that |inner(≻1,≻2)| ≥ 2. Let
≻1 and ≻2 be single-peaked. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there are two distinct
alternatives x, y ∈ inner(≻1,≻2) with x ≻1 y and x ≻2 y—the case with y ≻1 x and y ≻2 x works
analogously. Since a1 ≻1 b1 and b1 ≻2 a1, it follows that x, y /∈ {a1, b1}. By the definition of a1 and
b1 and since x, y ∈ inner(≻1,≻2), this implies that a1 ≻1 x ≻1 y ≻1 b1 and b1 ≻2 x ≻2 y ≻2 a1—a
contradiction to Lemma 1.
Now, we are ready to describe Algorithm 1. It consists of two parts, the initialization and
the main loop. In the initialization, we embed all inner alternatives (see Lines 2–6) in such a
way that the left-to-right (resp. the right-to-left) order corresponds to the preferences of v2 (resp.
v1). By Lemma 2 (3), it follows that the most preferred alternative of v1, denoted as a1, is the
right-most alternative, while the most preferred alternative of v2, denoted as b1, is the left-most
alternative. Then, in Lines 7–8 we embed voter v2 (resp. v1) to the left of a1 (resp. to the right of
b1). Summarizing, we observe the following about the initialization step.
Proposition 1. Let E be the embedding constructed by the end of the initialization phase (Lines 2–
8) of Algorithm 1. Let c1, . . . , cx be the embedded alternatives with E(c1) < · · · < E(cx). The
following holds.
(1) inner(≻1,≻2) = {c1, c2, . . . , cx} with cx = a1 and c1 = b1.
(2) Voter v2 prefers c1 ≻2 c2 ≻2 · · · ≻2 cx.
(3) E(v1)− E(v2) = |inner(≻1,≻2)|+ 1.
(4) E(v2) < E(c1) and E(cx) < E(v1).
(5) If ≻1 and ≻2 are single-peaked, then voter v1 prefers cx ≻1 cx−1 ≻1 · · · ≻1 c1.
Proof. The first three statements follow directly from Lines 3–6 and from the definition of inner(≻1
,≻2). Moreover, it holds that E(c1) = 1, E(cx) = |inner(≻1,≻2)|, E(v2) = 0, and E(v1) = |inner(≻1
,≻2)|+ 1. This implies the fourth statement.
As to the last statement, consider an arbitrary embedded alternative cj with j ∈ {1, . . . , x− 1}.
Then, by the second statement, we have that cj ≻2 cj+1. By Lemma 2(3), we have that cj+1 ≻1
cj .
After having embedded all inner alternatives, the main loop (Lines 9–14) extends the embedding
by alternatingly placing alternatives that should be embedded to the right of the existing embedding
and alternatives that should be embedded to the left of the existing embedding. The correspond-
ing procedure is called Refine() (Lines 15–28) and is used for both voters v1 and v2. It searches
through the alternatives along the preference order of v1 (resp. v2), finds the first not-yet-embedded
alternative(s) that are ranked between two consecutive embedded alternatives by v1 (resp. v2), and
embeds them to the right (resp. left) of the right-most (resp. left-most) alternative. Fallback() in
Line 13 guarantees that at least one alternative is embedded during each iteration, thus ensuring
that the algorithm terminates.
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In the following, we prove that our constructed embedding is indeed a one-dimensional Euclidean
representation by showing that whenever the embedding at the beginning of an iteration of the main
loop is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation with regard to the already embedded alterna-
tives, the embedding at the end of the iteration is also a one-dimensional Euclidean representation.
To this end, let D = {d1, d2, . . . , dw} be the alternatives that are embedded at the beginning of
an iteration (Line 9) with E(d1) < E(d2) < · · · < E(dw), and assume that E is a one-dimensional
Euclidean representation for all alternatives from D. We introduce the following notation regard-
ing the concept of a worst alternative among a given set of alternatives. Let worst(D, v1) (resp.
worst(D, v2)) denote the alternative from D that is least preferred by voter v1 (resp. v2) i.e.
worst(D, v1) ∈ D with (D \ {a
∗}) ≻1 a
∗, and worst(D, v2) ∈ D with (D \ {b
∗}) ≻2 b
∗.
Example 2. Consider the following preferences of voters v1 and v2.
v1 : 1 ≻1 4 ≻1 2 ≻1 3 ≻1 5 ≻1 6 ≻1 7 ≻1 8,
v2 : 3 ≻2 2 ≻2 1 ≻2 5 ≻2 6 ≻2 4 ≻2 8 ≻2 7.
If D = {1, 2, 3, 4}, then worst(D, v1) = 3 and worst(D, v2) = 4.
We introduce another notion called no later than.
Definition 5 (No later than). For two distinct alternatives x and y, we say that x is embedded no
later than y if one of the following holds.
(1) Alternatives x and y are both embedded during initialization.
(2) They are both embedded in the same call to Refine().
(3) When y is to be embedded, E(x) is already defined.
To show that each iteration (Lines 9–14) maintains the one-dimensional Euclidean property of
the embedding, we observe the following useful properties.
Lemma 3. Let x and y be two distinct alternatives with x ≻1 y and x ≻2 y. Then, Algorithm 1
embeds x no later than y.
Proof. If y ∈ inner(≻1,≻2), then by Lemma 2 (2), it follows that x ∈ inner(≻1,≻2), meaning that
x and y are both embedded during the initialization, and that x is embedded no later than y.
Now, let us assume that y /∈ inner(≻1,≻2). Consider the step when y was embedded. There are
three cases.
If y has been embedded in Line 21 in a call to Refine(≻1, v1), then let j and i be the indices as
defined in that call such that aj 1 y ≻1 ai. If E(x) was defined, i.e. x has already been embedded,
then by the definition of “no later than”, x is embedded no later than y. If E(x) was not defined,
then since aj was defined as the first alternative that is not yet embedded, it follows that aj 1 x.
Since x ≻1 y, it follows that aj ≻1 x ≻1 y ≻1 ai, implying that x is embedded in the same call to
Refine () as y. Thus, x is embedded no later than y.
Using a reasoning similar to the previous case, we can infer that x is also embedded no later
than y when y has been embedded in call to Refine(≻2, v2) because x ≻2 y.
If y has been embedded in the subprocedure Fallback() in Line 13, meaning that it is also the
only alternative that is embedded during that iteration, then line 30 guarantees that E(x) was
already defined, and thus, x is embedded no later than y.
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The next lemma ensures that each alternative not from inner(≻1,≻2) is embedded by exactly
one of the three subroutines—Refine(≻1, v1), Refine(≻2, v2), or Fallback().
Lemma 4. Let ≻1 and ≻2 be two single-peaked preference orders. Consider an arbitrary not-yet-
embedded alternative x, i.e. x /∈ D. Then, worst(D,≻1) ≻1 x or worst(D,≻2) ≻2 x.
Proof. Let a∗ = worst(D,≻1) and b
∗ = worst(D,≻2). Towards a contradiction, suppose that ≻1
and ≻2 are single-peaked but x is an alternative with x /∈ D such that
x ≻1 a
∗ and x ≻2 b
∗. (1)
This implies that
a1 6= a
∗ and b1 6= b
∗, (2)
as a1 ≻1 x and b1 ≻2 x; recall that a1 (resp. b1) is the alternative most preferred by voter v1 (resp.
v2). By Lemma 3 and since x is not yet embedded, the assumption (1) also implies that
v1 : b
∗ ≻1 x ≻1 a
∗ and v2 : a
∗ ≻2 x ≻2 b
∗, and thus, (3)
a∗ 6= b∗. (4)
By the definitions of a1 and b1, we further infer that
v1 : a1 1 b
∗ ≻1 x ≻1 a
∗ and v2 : b1 2 a
∗ ≻2 x ≻2 b
∗. (5)
We distinguish between two cases, in each case aiming to obtain x ∈ inner(≻1,≻2) which is a
contradiction to x /∈ D as inner(≻1,≻2) ⊆ D.
Case 1: If a1 = b
∗, then the preferences given in (5) are equivalent to
v1 : a1 ≻1 x ≻1 a
∗ and v2 : b1 2 a
∗ ≻2 x ≻2 a1. (6)
Furthermore, b1 6= a
∗ as otherwise x ∈ inner(≻1,≻2)—a contradiction. Consequently, the prefer-
ences given in (6) imply that
v1 : a1 ≻1 x ≻1 a
∗ and v2 : b1 ≻2 a
∗ ≻2 x ≻2 a1. (7)
Since ≻1 and ≻2 are single-peaked, by Lemma 1 and by (7), we must have that x ≻1 b1. However,
this implies that x ∈ inner(≻1,≻2) since x ≻2 a1—a contradiction.
Case 2: If a1 6= b
∗, then the preferences given in (5) imply that
v1 : a1 ≻1 b
∗ ≻1 x ≻1 a
∗ and v2 : b1 2 a
∗ ≻2 x ≻2 b
∗. (8)
Since ≻1 and ≻2 are single-peaked, by Lemma 1 and by (8), we must have that x ≻2 a1 and x ≻1 b1,
implying that x ∈ inner(≻1,≻2)—a contradiction.
For two distinct alternatives that have not been embedded, we observe the following.
Lemma 5. Let ≻1 and ≻2 be two single-peaked preference orders. Let x and y be two distinct
alternatives that have not been embedded, i.e. x, y /∈ D with x 6= y. For each r ∈ {1, 2} it holds that
if x ≻r y ≻r worst(D,≻r), then worst(D,≻s) ≻s x ≻s y, where s ∈ {1, 2} \ {r}.
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Proof. Assume that x ≻r y ≻r worst(D,≻r) holds. Let best(≻r) be the most preferred alternative
in the preference order ≻r. Then, we have that
best(≻r) ≻r x ≻r y ≻r worst(D,≻r). (9)
By Lemma 4, it follows that worst(D,≻s) ≻s {x, y}. Thus, it remains to show that x ≻s y.
Towards a contradiction, suppose that y ≻s x. By the definition of worst(D,≻s), voter vs must have
preferences
{best(≻r),worst(D,≻r)} s worst(D,≻s) ≻s y ≻s x. (10)
Together with (9), we have
best(r) ≻r x ≻r y ≻r worst(D,≻r), and {best(r),worst(D,≻r)} ≻s y ≻s x,
a contradiction to Lemma 1.
We observe the following for the subprocedure Refine(≻, v).
Lemma 6. Let j and i be as defined in a call to Refine(≻, v). If E is a one-dimensional Euclidean
representation for the alternatives cj−1 and ci and for the voter v so that the 1-Euclidean property
is satisfied, then |E(cj−1)− E(v)| < |E(cj)−E(v)| < · · · < |E(ci−1)− E(v)| < |E(ci)−E(v)|.
Proof. By the definitions of j and i, since the 1-Euclidean property is maintained for voter v, it
holds that
dist(j − 1) = |E(cj−1)− E(v)| < |E(ci)− E(v)| = dist(i), (11)
Note that dist(j − 1) and dist(i) are defined in Lines 19–20. From Lines 23–25, it is straightforward
to verify that for each ck with j − 1 ≤ k ≤ i,
|E(ck)− E(v)| = dist(j − 1) +
dist(i) − dist(j − 1)
i− j + 1
· (k − j + 1) (12)
Combining (12) with (11), we obtain the chain of inequalities in the lemma.
3.2 Correctness of Theorem 1
From Lemma 6, we know that Refine(≻, v) ensures the one-dimensional Euclidean property for
voter v with regard to the already embedded and the newly added alternatives. Together with
Lemmas 3 to 5, we are ready to show the correctness of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let ≻1 and≻2 be single-peaked. First of all, by Proposition 1, the initialization
phase computes a one-dimensional Euclidean representation of the two preference orders ≻1 and
≻2 when restricted to the inner alternatives inner(≻1,≻2). Thus, to prove the correctness, we only
need to show that each iteration of the main loop (Lines 9–14) returns an extended embedding
that is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation of the embedded alternatives. To achieve this,
we need to show that the procedures Refine(≻1, v1), Refine(≻2, v2), and Lines 31–32 extend the
existing one-dimensional Euclidean representation to one that is one-dimensional Euclidean with
respect to the alternatives that have already been embedded and also with respect to those which
are newly embedded. To this end, let D be the alternatives that are embedded at the beginning of
an iteration, and assume that E is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for all alternatives
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in D. Let a∗ = worst(D, v1) (resp. b
∗ = worst(D, v2)) denote the alternative from D that is least
preferred by voter v1 (resp. v2). Let C be the set of alternatives that are to be embedded.
We distinguish between three cases.
Case 1: C has been embedded in a call to Refine(≻1, v1). By the procedure Refine(≻1, v1), the two
embedded alternatives that the algorithm identifies are aj and ai such that C = {aj , aj+1, . . . , ai−1}
and
aj ≻1 aj+1 ≻1 . . . ai−1 ≻1 ai 1 a
∗. (13)
By assumption, the embedding E is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for voters v1 and v2
and for the alternatives from D. By Lemma 6, it follows that E is also a one-dimensional Euclidean
representation for voter v1 and for all alternatives from D ∪ C. In particular, it holds that,
∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i− 1} : |E(ak)− E(v1)| < |E(ak+1)−E(v1)|. (14)
It remains to show that E is also a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for voter v2 and
for all alternatives from D ∪ C. Using Lemma 5 on the preferences in (13), voter v2 must have
preferences b∗ ≻2 aj ≻2 aj+1 ≻2 · · · ≻2 ai−1. By the embedding of the alternatives from C
(Line 23), for each alternative ak with j ≤ k ≤ i− 1 it holds that
E(v2) < E(v1) < E(ak) < E(ak+1), (15)
implying that |E(ak)−E(v2)| < |E(ak+1−E(v2))|. Thus, to show that E remains a one-dimensional
Euclidean representation for voter v2 regarding the alternatives from D ∪ C, we only need to show
that |E(b∗)− E(v2)| < |E(aj)− E(v2)|. Now, if we can show that
b∗ 1 aj−1, (16)
then we can derive that
|E(b∗)− E(v2)| ≤ |E(b
∗)− E(v1)|+ |E(v1)− E(v2)|
(16)
< |E(aj−1)− E(v1)|+ |E(v1)− E(v2)|
(14)
< |E(aj)− E(v1)|+ |E(v1)− E(v2)|
(15)
= |E(aj)− E(v2)|,
which is what we needed to show.
Thus, the only task remained is to show that (16) holds. We distinguish between two cases. If
b∗ ∈ inner(≻1,≻2), then b
∗ 2 a1. By the definition of b
∗, this implies b∗ = a1, and thus b
∗ 1 aj−1
as a1 is the first alternative in ≻1.
If b∗ /∈ inner(≻1,≻2), then b
∗ was embedded during a previous iteration of the main loop.
Let us consider this iteration where b∗ was embedded. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that
aj−1 ≻1 b
∗. By the definition of aj, it follows that aj ≻1 aj+1 ≻1 · · · ≻1 ai−1 ≻1 b
∗. Since aj will
be embedded later than b∗, it follows that Refine(≻1, v1) returned false. However, Refine(≻2, v2)
also returned false since no alternative bi′ exists that is embedded before b
∗ such that b∗ ≻2 bi′ .
Finally, the subprocedure Fallback() in Line 13 could not have applied since there aj remained
unembedded during this iteration but aj ≻1 b
∗. Thus, there is no way b∗ could have been embedded
— a contradiction. Summarizing, we have shown that b∗ 1 aj−1. This completes the proof for the
first case.
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Case 2: C has been embedded in a call to Refine(≻1, v1). The reasoning is very similar to the
one for Case 1. The two embedded alternatives identified by the algorithm are bj and bi such that
C = {bj , bj+1, . . . , bi−1} and
bj ≻2 bj+1 ≻2 . . . bi−1 ≻2 bi 2 b
∗. (17)
By assumption, the embedding E is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for voters v1 and v2
and for the alternatives from D. By Lemma 6, it follows that E is also a one-dimensional Euclidean
representation for voter v2 and for all alternatives from D ∪ C. In particular, it holds that,
∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i− 1} : |E(bk)− E(v1)| < |E(bk+1)− E(v1)|. (18)
It remains to show that E is also a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for voter v1 and
for all alternatives from D ∪ C. Using Lemma 5 on the preferences in (17), voter v1 must have
preferences a∗ ≻1 bj ≻1 bj+1 ≻1 · · · ≻1 bi−1. By the embedding of the alternatives from C
(Line 23), for each alternative bk with j ≤ k ≤ i− 1 it holds that
E(bk′) < E(bk) < E(v2) < E(v1), (19)
implying that |E(bk)−E(v1)| < |E(bk′ −E(v1))|. Thus, to show that E remains a one-dimensional
Euclidean representation for voter v1 regarding the alternatives from D ∪ C, we only need to show
that |E(a∗)− E(v1)| < |E(bj)− E(v1)|.
Now, if we can show that
a∗ 2 bj−1, (20)
then we can derive that
|E(a∗)− E(v1)| ≤ |E(a
∗)− E(v2)|+ |E(v1)− E(v2)|
(20)
< |E(bj−1)− E(v2)|+ |E(v1)− E(v2)|
(18)
< |E(bj)− E(v2)|+ |E(v1)− E(v2)|
(19)
= |E(bj)− E(v1)|,
which is what we needed to show.
Thus, the only task remaining is to show that (20) holds. We distinguish between two cases. If
a∗ ∈ inner(≻1,≻2), then a
∗ 1 b1. By the definition of a
∗, this implies a∗ = b1, and it follows that
a∗ 2 bj−1 as b1 is the first alternative in ≻2.
If a∗ /∈ inner(≻1,≻2), then a
∗ was embedded during a previous iteration of the main loop.
Let us consider the iteration where a∗ was embedded. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that
bj−1 ≻2 a
∗. By the definition of bj, it follows that bj ≻2 bj+1 ≻2 · · · ≻2 bi−1 ≻2 a
∗. Since a∗ is the
embedded alternative least preferred one v1, it follows that Refine(≻1, v1) returned false. However,
when Refine(≻2, v2) was called, all alternatives preferred to a
∗ by v2 must not be embedded later
than a∗—a contradiction since bj will be embedded later than a
∗. Summarizing, we have shown
that a∗ 2 bj−1. This completes the proof of the second case.
Case 3: C has been embedded in a call to Fallback(). Thus, it must hold that
D ≻1 C and D ≻2 C. (21)
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We infer that C = {aj} where j = |D|+ 1, and that
E(v1) < E(aj). (22)
To show the one-dimensional Euclidean property, we only need to show that |E(a∗) − E(v1)| <
|E(aj) − E(v1)| and |E(b
∗) − E(v2)| < |E(aj) − E(v2)|. By Lines 30–32, it holds that a
∗ = aj−1.
Thus, we infer that
|E(a∗)− E(v1)| = |E(aj)− E(v1)| − 1 < |E(aj)− E(v1)|. (23)
By the definition of a∗ and b∗ voter v1 has preferences
b∗ 1 a
∗. (24)
Since E is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation for the voter v2 and for the alternatives in
d, this implies the following.
|E(b∗)− E(v2)| ≤ |E(b
∗)− E(v1)|+ |E(v1)− E(v2)|
(24)
≤ |E(a∗)− E(v1)|+ |E(v1)− E(v2)|
(23)
< |E(aj)− E(v1)|+ |E(v1)− E(v2)|
(22)
= |E(aj)− E(v2)|.
To conclude, we have shown that in each case the algorithm extends the embedding so that the
resulting embedding is a one-dimensional Euclidean representation of both voters and of the al-
ternatives already embedded as well as the newly embedded alternatives. Thus, our algorithm
indeed computes a one-dimensional Euclidean representation of two voters whose preferences are
single-peaked.
Example 3. We illustrate our algorithm using the profile from Example 2, with two voters and
eight alternatives:
v1 : 1 ≻1 4 ≻1 2 ≻1 3 ≻1 5 ≻1 6 ≻1 7 ≻1 8,
v2 : 3 ≻2 2 ≻2 1 ≻2 5 ≻2 6 ≻2 4 ≻2 8 ≻2 7.
It is single-peaked with respect to the order ⊲ with 8⊲6⊲3⊲2⊲1⊲4⊲7, and also with respect to
the reverse of ⊲. Given this profile as input, our algorithm will return a one-dimensional Euclidean
embedding which is depicted in the following line.
8 6 5 3 2 1 4 7v2 v1
−10 −9 −8 −7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
First of all, our algorithm embeds the inner alternatives inner(≻1,≻2) = {1, 2, 3} between
voter v1 at 4 and voter v2 at 0.
In iteration 1, alternative 4 is embedded to the right of voter v1, as it is the first not-yet-
embedded alternative in the preferences of v1 and there is an embedded alternative, namely 2, such
that v1 prefers 4 to 2.
After alternative 4 has been embedded, alternatives 5 and 6 are embedded to the left of the
left-most alternative, namely 3. This is because v1 prefers each embedded alternative to each not-
yet-embedded alternative (i.e. Refine(≻, v1) would return false). Alternatives 5 and 6 are the first
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not-yet-embedded alternatives in the preference order of v2, and there is an embedded alternative,
namely 4, such that v2 prefers {5, 6} to 4.
In iteration 2, that is, after alternatives 5 and 6 have been embedded, neither Refine(≻1, v1) nor
Refine(≻2, v2) return true. Alternative 7 is the first not-yet-embedded alternative in the preference
order of v1. Thus, the Fallback() function embeds 7 to the right of v1 so that it becomes the
right-most alternative.
Finally, in iteration 3, Refine(≻1, v1) returns false. Then, in Refine(≻2, v2), alternative 8 is
embedded to the left of the left-most alternative, namely 6, as 8 is the first not-yet-embedded
alternative in the preferences of v2 and there is an embedded alternative, namely 7, such that v2
prefers alternative 8 to 7.
The following table summarizes how the algorithm proceeds with the above profile as in-
put. More precisely, row one shows the iteration in increasing order; row two shows which
subprocedure in the specific iteration has embedded some alternatives (row three). For
each alternative in row three, the embedding of this alternative is depicted in the last row.
Iteration 0 1 2 3
Call Initialization Refine(≻1, v1) Refine(≻2, v2) Fallback() Refine(≻2, v2)
Embedded alt. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Position 3 2 1 112 −
23
6 −
28
6
41
3 −
115
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4 Single-peaked and single-crossing profiles with up to five alter-
natives
In this section, we state and prove our second main result concerning preference profiles with up to
five alternatives.
Theorem 3. Each preference profile with up to five alternatives is one-dimensional Euclidean if
and only if it is single-peaked and single-crossing.
Proof. As already discussed in the introduction, a one-dimensional Euclidean profile necessarily is
single-peaked and single-crossing. Thus, to show the theorem, it suffices to show that every single-
peaked and single-crosssing preference profile with up to five alternatives is also one-dimensional
Euclidean. We achieve this by using a computer program that exhaustively searches for all possible
single-peaked and single-crossing profiles with up to five alternatives and provide a one-dimensional
Euclidean embedding for each of them. We did some optimization to shrink our search space
extensively. First of all, we only consider profiles with at least two alternatives and at least two
voters who have pairwise distinct preference orders as two voters with the same preference order can
be embedded at the same position without losing the one-dimensional Euclidean property. Since
the relevant profiles in consideration must be single-crossing, by [14, Lemma 1] and [7, Section 2.1],
our program only searches for profiles with at most
(
m
2
)
distinct preference orders, where m is
the number of alternatives, 3 ≤ m ≤ 5. The minimum number of voters we need to consider is
three as by Theorem 2 all single-peaked and single-crossing preference profiles with two voters are
one-dimensional Euclidean.
Second, we assume that one of the preference orders in the sought profile is 1 ≻ 2 ≻ . . . ≻ m.
We denote this order as the canonical preference order.
Third, using the monotonicity of the single-peaked property, we consider adding a preference
order (there are m!− 1 many) to form a potential relevant single-peaked and single-crossing profile
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m
n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
3 5 6 2 - - - - - - -
4 19 69 108 90 39 7 - - - -
5 69 567 2124 4810 7185 7273 4969 2196 570 66
Table 1: For each number m of alternatives stated in the first column and for each number n of
voters stated in the first row, 3 ≤ m ≤ 5 and 2 ≤ n ≤
(
m
2
)
+ 1, we summarize the number of
single-peaked and single-crossing preference profiles we have produced that contain the canonical
preference order 1 ≻ 2 ≻ · · · ≻ m and no two voters that have the same preference orders. For
instance, when m = 3 and n = 4, the number of sought preference profiles is 2, as indicated in row
two and column four.
only if it is single-peaked with the canonical one. By [17, Theorem 12(i)], among allm!−1 preference
orders other than the canonical one, there are
(2m−2
m−1
)
− 1 preference orders that are single-peaked
with the canonical one. Note that for m = 5, the number of potentially single-peaked profiles with
n =
(5
2
)
+ 1 = 11 voters would be reduced from
(
m!−1
n
)
=
(119
11
)
to
((2m−2m−1 )−1
11
)
=
(69
11
)
.
We summarize the number of single-peaked and single-crossing profile with up to m = 5 alter-
natives and up to n =
(
m
2
)
+ 1 in Table 1. Note that we include profiles which have two voters
although by Theorem 1 all single-peaked and single-crossing preference profile with two voters are
one-dimensional Euclidean.
We implemented a program which, for each of these produced profiles, uses the IBM ILOG
CPLEX optimization software package to check and find a one-dimensional Euclidean embedding.
The results can be found in https://tubcloud.tu-berlin.de/s/ArdQzFd8J6L5YFN and can be
verified via the program given in https://tubcloud.tu-berlin.de/s/rSNKkm8dtPkRKnE.
5 Conclusion and outlook
We have shown that for profiles with at most five alternatives or at most two voters, being single-
peaked and single-crossing suffices for being one-dimensional Euclidean. Our research leads to
some interesting follow up questions. First of all, using our computer program from Section 4
we can produce all single-peaked and single-crossing profiles and all one-dimensional Euclidean
profiles. A natural question is to count the number of structured (e.g. single-peaked, single-
crossing, one-dimensional Euclidean) preference profiles and provide a closed formula in terms of
the number m of alternatives and the number n of voters, in a similar spirit as recent work by
Lackner and Lackner [17] and Chen and Finnendahl [11].
Second, both the single-peaked and the single-crossing property can be characterized by a few
small forbidden subprofiles [1, 7]. However, this is not the case for the one-dimensional Euclidean
property [12]. Thus we ask: is it possible to characterize small one-dimensional Euclidean preference
profiles via a few forbidden subprofiles? Chen [10, Chapter 4.11] provided a generic construction
and showed that there are at least n! single-peaked and single-crossing profiles with n = m/2 voters
and m alternatives that are not one-dimensional Euclidean. For m = 6, this number would be 6.
However, through our computer program we found that for m = 6 and n = 3, out of 4179 single-
peaked and single-crossing preference profiles, there are 48 ones which are not one-dimensional
Euclidean, which is more than 6.
Last but not least, for d ≥ 2, d-dimensional Euclidean profiles are not necessarily single-peaked
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nor single-crossing [4]. In other words, the forbidden subprofiles that are used to characterize single-
peaked or single-crossing profiles are not of use to characterize d-dimensional Euclidean profiles.
This leads to the question of sufficient and necessary conditions for profiles to be d-dimensional
Euclidean. Bogomolnaia and Laslier [4] answered this question for profiles that may contain ties.
Bulteau and Chen [9] used a computer program to verify that all preference profiles with up to
seven alternatives and up to three voters are 2-dimensional Euclidean.
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